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Abstract 
 
The purpose of the article is a comprehensive 
analysis of the issue of the judge’s interpretive 
activity from the standpoint of the judge’s 
cognition in such a process of unchangeable 
dualism of the factual circumstances of the case 
and the norm of the law. To achieve this goal, 
such methods as dialectic, comparative, formal-
logical, communicative and phenomenological 
was used. The article deals with the approach 
according to which the judge's interpretive 
activity during professional occupation is a 
necessary method of specifying the content of 
abstract, relatively defined legal norms; and 
these norms become applicable in solving certain 
debatable questions. It is concluded that the 
judge creates the search for the best solution of a 
particular legal position. Reconciling the 
uniqueness of the law case and the formality of 
the legislative provisions resolving case is 
impossible without interpretive activity. One of 
the peculiarities of the dynamics of the 
interpretive activity of the European Court of 
Human Rights is its intellectual and creative 
nature; mechanical transformation of the norms 
of law into individual acts and "stereotype" 
application of previous court decisions are not 
admissible. The judge's interpretive activity 
combines rational-technical and existential-
semantic levels, which necessitates a high level 
of personal and professional maturity of the 
judge. The problem of interpretation is not only 
technical skills in legislative provisions; it covers 
an important "standpoint" of the reality based on 
  Анотація 
 
Метою статті є комплексний аналіз проблеми 
інтерпретаційної активності судді з позиції 
пізнання суддею у такому процесі незмінного 
дуалізму фактичних обставин справи й норми 
закону. Для досягнення цієї мети 
використовувались такі методи, як 
діалектичний, порівняльний, формально-
логічний, комунікативний та феноме-
нологічний. У статті аргументується підхід, 
згідно з яким інтерпретаційна активність судді 
під час професійної діяльності є необхідним 
засобом, за допомогою якого зміст абстрактних, 
відносно визначених правових норм 
конкретизується, і вони стають застосовними 
при вирішенні окремих спірних ситуацій. 
Зроблено висновки про те, що суддя моделює 
пошук оптимального рішення щодо конкретної 
юридичної ситуації. Узгодження унікальності 
судової справи та формальності законодавчих 
приписів, які вирішують при вирішенні цієї 
справи неможливе без інтерпретаційної 
активності. Однією з особливостей динаміки 
інтерпретаційної активності Європейського 
суду з прав людини є його інтелектуально-
творчий характер; не допустимі механічна 
трансформація норм права в індивідуальні акти 
та «шаблонне» використання попередніх 
судових рішень. Інтерпретаційна активність 
судді поєднує в собі раціонально-технічний та 
екзистенційно-смисловий рівні, зумовлює 
необхідність високого рівня особистісної й 
професійної зрілості в судді. Проблема 
тлумачення не зводиться до суто технічної 
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the professional experience and legal 
consciousness.  
 
Key words: decision of the ECHR, 
interpretation of law, legal argumentation, legal 
communication, legal consciousness. 
 
майстерності оперування законодавчими 
приписами, в ній важливим моментом є «кут 
зору» на дійсність, що виробляється на основі 
професійного досвіду й стійко закріплюється у 
правосвідомості.  
 
Ключові слова:  інтерпретація права, правова 
аргументація, правова комунікація, правова 
свідомість, рішення Європейського суду з прав 
людини.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The uniqueness and originality of the specific 
factual circumstances of the case and the 
formality of the general provisions of the law, 
which are applied by a court in the solution of 
this case, are impossible without the 
interpretative component. The hermeneutic 
constant in the law enforcement activity is able 
to give a new impetus to the development of a 
judge's opinion for solving contemporary 
pressing issues that are not always clearly 
defined by the law. 
 
Progressive dynamic social life is constantly 
being modified, complicated and it requires 
relevant legal determination. The ability of a 
legislative norm to change with a change in 
social relations is a basic feature of its 
effectiveness and determines its ability to act as 
a reliable regulator of social relations. Instead, 
the law is not always able to provide for an 
infinite number of possible socially changeable 
social situations, the full variety of cases of its 
practical application. 
 
Reconciling the universality of the provision of 
law and the individuality of the factual 
circumstances of a particular case is a complex 
cognitive process, in which the judge plays a 
special role. An experienced judge finds a 
"middle ground" between the formality, the 
generality of the law, and the individual, special 
features of a particular case, which is the most 
important point in a judge's knowledge: to 
interpret the general legislative norm taking into 
account the special features of a particular 
situation. The role of the judge in the application 
of law is that, interpreting the abstract norm of 
law, he / she simultaneously acts as the creator of 
its meaning in each case, "here and now". It is the 
intellectual component of the interpreter-judge in 
the procedure of application of the legal norm is 
a decisive factor, and his/her thinking is the key 
mechanism that makes it possible to interpret the 
content of the law, to evaluate the essence of the 
latter, its relevance in terms of a particular 
situation. 
 
The issue of interpretive activity in the judge’s 
professional occupation is complex and 
debatable. There is a need for new scientific 
research. Therefore, the purpose of the study is a 
comprehensive analysis of the issue of the 
judge’s interpretive activity from the standpoint 
of the judge’s cognition in such a process of 
unchangeable dualism of the factual 
circumstances of the case and the norm of the 
law. The subject of the study is to characterize 
the rational-technical and existential-semantic 
levels of the process of interpretation of law and 
the act of legislation by the judge; to analyze the 
principle of effective and dynamic interpretation 
in the decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights; to substantiate the attributive role of legal 
consciousness in the judge's interpretive 
activities; to investigate the unity of 
communication and play principles of 
interpretation in court proceedings; to clarify the 
peculiarities of the transformation of the conflict 
of interpretation of the norm-fact relations into 
the conflict of argumentation of the legal 
positions of the parties to a court action 
 
Theoretical frame work 
 
The state of the outlined issues shows that 
attempts to reconstruct the scientific works and 
to form new conceptual approaches to the 
description of effective means of organizational, 
procedural, methodological support of the 
cognitive interpretive activity of the judge were 
identified in the legal doctrine. The analysis of 
the main directions of legal thought, such as the 
schools of "free law" (Erlich, 2011), pragmatic 
instrumentalism (Pound, 2002), legal realism 
(Holmes, 2011), and existential and 
hermeneutical phenomenology (Gadamer, 
1988), which, in their knowledge of the true 
nature of judicial activity, typically accentuated 
their attention to the problems of judicial law-
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finding, judicial interpretation, the 
nonconformity of normative law and 
multifaceted social life, criticism of mechanical 
adjudication, – led to the conclusion concerning 
the interactions of conceptual projections of the 
above directions. At the same time, each 
conceptual projection as a universal logical 
construction remains a speculative system based 
on a number of fundamental provisions, offers its 
view on judicial activity in the context of legal 
interpretative functioning. 
 
E. Ehrlich (2011), the founder of the 
contemporary sociological direction in law 
carried out significant actualization of the 
problems of judicial law-finding and the essential 
role of interpretation in this process. He 
emphasized that the law is never complete and 
adequate; changes in social conditions inevitably 
lead to its application in the spirit of modern 
times. Only "living law" responds to permanent 
changeable demands of reality, it changes 
according to the necessities of life, organically 
develops and improves in the context of social 
relations. 
 
H.-G.Gadamer (1988) analyzed the principles of 
interdependence of jurisprudence and legal 
interpretation on the basis of the universal 
hermeneutical method. Gadamerian 
hermeneutics is a philosophy of understanding as 
a means of the existence of a person who 
recognizes, evaluates and acts. The most 
important goal of  Gadamer's philosophical 
hermeneutics was to achieve a theoretical 
recognition of hermeneutical experience. In 
order to analyze this concept, the author used a 
model of the relationship between the reader and 
the text, which was the prototype for the model 
of the relationship between the subject of 
knowledge and the known object. Using this 
model, he demonstrated the continuity of three 
components of experience – understanding, 
interpretation and application. H.-G.Gadamer 
points to the possibility of its practical 
application in the field of justice. The legal text 
implements itself only through interpretation, the 
law is a "dead" zero-value matter that comes to 
life and finds its existence only in fulfillment. 
 
P.Ricoeur (1995) compared interpretation of 
general norms with the search for a just solution 
of a legal conflict. The philosopher assumes that 
the wealth of the daily life relationships that 
initiate true ("unwritten") law cannot be reflected 
in abstract norms, and, therefore, a judge should 
"find" this law from the social content of the case 
itself, be guided by reason, conscience, ideas 
about the just in modern life. 
A.Kaufmann (2009) revealed legal hermeneutics 
as an original means of law- finding. The 
scientist deeply convinced that "just" law 
combines the complementary elements of 
essence (justice as the natural state of man) and 
existence. Law in its development is explored 
through combining structured elements of 
essence and existence in the hermeneutic circle. 
This process is not limited to the level of 
legislation, and it mainly takes place at the level 
of court negotiations. A hermeneutical method 
gives understanding of "just" law, and the basis 
of its finding is somewhat "ontological" – 
freedom as a natural state of man, which cannot 
be removed directly from the abstract legal norm 
and which the judge cannot "dispose of at 
discretion", is "object-law". 
 
Methodology 
 
Any process of cognition is based on the 
fundamental choice of methods that can play a 
decisive role in its course and determine its 
ideological core and purpose. Sometimes one of 
the methods is fully implemented in a specific 
context, but none can be recognized as exclusive 
and absolute. The proclamation of a priori 
dominant provision is always counterbalanced by 
another one, indicating the constant role of 
dialectics. Scientific and practical study of the 
issue of interpretation of law, which is 
determined by the use of dialectic methodology, 
defines its volumetric dimension and takes into 
account the complex nature. The use of this 
approach reveals the diversity and complexity of 
the process of interpretation, within which the 
interaction and balancing of the abstract and 
concrete, dynamics and statics, norms and facts 
take place. 
 
The necessity to compare antinomic models of 
interpretation – the restrictive within the law and 
the extended in accordance with the principles of 
law; diametrically opposed cognitive styles of 
constructing court speeches in professional and 
jury trials; the specifics of the rational-technical 
and existential-semantic levels of interpretation  
– led to the use of the comparative method. Using 
the formal and logical method promoted to 
formulate the basic concepts of the study, to 
ensure the consistency of presentation of the 
paper. 
 
The communicative method was used in the 
process of sociocultural analysis of the legal 
thinking of a judge as an important instrument for 
cognition of social life, formulation of one's own 
judgments in the process of communication, 
legal views, beliefs and values; in the process of 
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generalization of the specifics of the trial as a 
discursive struggle between the parties to 
interpret the provisions of the law; in the process 
of description of judicial argumentation and 
eristic. The phenomenological method made it 
possible to investigate the interpretation of 
judicial activity in the field of practical 
gnoseology of law, to examine the reflexive 
activity of the judge’s consciousness. 
 
However, evaluating the problem of the judge's 
interpretive activity in the context of cognition of 
the fact-norm dichotomy, you should take into 
account the system of the above methods in 
general. Each established methodological 
concept has a dual aspect; if you consider it in 
isolation, it may lead to bias and unreasonable 
conclusions. If you consider it to be a part of 
universalized system of methods, it will allow 
comprehensively understanding the problem 
outlined in this study in general. 
 
Results and discussion  
 
Rational-technical and existential-semantic 
levels of interpretation. 
 
The variety of life circumstances, their 
unpredictability, as well as the complexity of law 
itself, the understanding of its essence do not 
allow solving any legal position with absolute 
accuracy, "mathematically". Such abstraction 
will inevitably encounter difficulties of 
implementation in the presence of atypical, 
single, extraordinary life circumstances. All 
circumstances of life are different, and it is 
impossible to determine their features in one 
abstract provision of the law. Describing the 
aforementioned problem, A. Kaufmann (2009) 
wrote, law can become a reality only in the live 
interaction of people, their legal relations, 
because law is nothing but "correct action and 
correct decision in a particular situation", not a 
scheme of the law for correct action. 
 
The interpretative component in the judicial 
activity as a mental process of obtaining the 
judge's true knowledge of the factual side of the 
case is carried out in the area of rational-technical 
and existential-semantic methodological levels. 
 
Having adopted rationalism as a methodological 
level of interpretation, as the main gnoseological 
guideline, the search for a substantive legal 
solution of the situation (the solution of the 
situation on its merits), for which a true solution 
must be found, also comes to maximum 
logicality and consistency. Objective truth is 
achieved as a result of rational cognition, which 
is characterized by reliance on logical 
convincingness of thinking, preference for 
consistency of external credibility, construction 
of a special categorical mechanism, modeling of 
conceptual structures. Attributive features of 
rational interpretation are analysis (procedures of 
distinction, separation, and differentiation), 
synthesis (procedures of generalization, 
establishment of similarity, unification, and 
integration), consistency, conceptuality, 
reflectivity, logical severity and persuasiveness, 
systematic, discursive, critical, substantiated 
thoughts and their emancipation, appeals to the 
mind contrary to the feelings. 
 
Mental activity concerning the evaluation of 
available information may not always be subject 
to the laws of logic, in which the conclusions 
imply strict consistency. Often, even the best 
techniques, state-of-the-art logic cannot 
guarantee the accuracy of the truth of knowledge. 
If, in a stable world, attributive features of 
rationality are sufficient because, by identifying 
typical situations, standard solutions can be 
developed for them, then in an information 
society, which is temporal, pluralistic, 
spontaneous, unstable, and integrative and 
becomes more and more global, there is a need 
for somewhat different thinking. 
 
All experience of rational cognition will have 
only a service character. Excessive adherence to 
logic will inevitably lead to schematization and 
simplification of a changeable social life rather 
than to grasping its deep foundations. In the 
course of his/her work, the judge not only guides 
the understanding and interpretation of law from 
the point of view of legal concepts and 
constructions of legal logic, but also resorts to an 
intuitive insight into the content of the norm of 
law, seeking its connection with real life 
(Merezhko, 2003). Due to the fact that legal 
thinking is deeply hermeneutic in nature and 
constantly replenished due to the individual cases 
that predetermine this knowledge, at present, the 
judge not only applies the law, but also 
contributes to the development of law by his / her 
own sentence (Chechulina, 2020). Their 
interpretation of law is not limited to the search 
for what the legislator once established and 
contained in the law, and in contrast, becomes an 
act of "new creative lawmaking". The longer the 
time between the date of issue of the norm of law 
and the moment of its application, the greater the 
freedom of judicial discretion for the completion 
of the norm, and the greater the need to take into 
account the change in socio-ethical ideas and the 
change under the influence of this necessity to 
the original purpose that the authors of the law 
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once set themselves. As a result, interpretation is 
not simply establishing what is already valid, but 
in some cases becoming an act of seeking and 
creating a new law (Krizhanovsky, 2010). 
 
The principle of effective and dynamic 
interpretation in the decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights. 
 
The legal position, according to which the 
interpretation of law is not limited to the search 
for what the legislator has established and 
contained in the law, but, in contrast, is an act of 
"creative lawmaking" that is now absolutely 
prevalent in the activities of the European Court 
of Human Rights. The interpretation of the 
decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights is not only an act of cognizing the facts of 
the case, establishing that it already has legal 
force, but an act of effective and dynamical 
creating a new law. 
 
The legal position formulated by the European 
Court of Human Rights in the case of                
Airey v. Ireland, – "The Convention is intended 
to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or 
illusory but rights that are practical and effective" 
– played a decisive role in determining its 
significance in the European system of protection 
of human rights. It was the need to put into 
practice the effective protection of human rights 
and freedoms that led to the application of an 
interpretation of the Convention by Court that 
would allow it extending the safeguards 
established by the Convention. Taking this fact 
into consideration, the principle of an effective 
and dynamic interpretation of the Convention 
provisions in the case-law of the Strasbourg 
Court has become a way of "exploitation" of the 
potentialities of the Convention. In its attempts to 
interpret the Convention, the Court is based more 
on its spirit than on its letter, and considers, first 
and foremost, the future prospects of its 
application, not its significance to the past. 
 
The decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights were adopted in order to ensure the 
"viability" of the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
and to maintain its effectiveness. The 
performance of the principle of effective 
interpretation of the Convention is that it allows 
best adapting the provisions of the Convention to 
the changeable social conditions. This principle 
determines the so-called "dynamic" or 
"evolutionary" interpretation of the Convention 
provisions applied by the Strasbourg Court. 
There is the provision in its case law that the 
Convention is a "living instrument" that should 
be interpreted "in the light of the present 
conditions" (Case of Airey v. Ireland, 1979). 
 
In its activities, the European Court of Human 
Rights adheres to the so-called model of 
compelling precedent, that is, the Court adheres 
to its previous interpretation in all cases where 
there is no good reason to refuse it. The former 
President of the Court, L. Wildhaber (2001), 
stated this position at one time, precedents should 
be followed regularly, but not invariably. The 
European Court of Human Rights itself outlines 
its attitude to previous decisions: "Although the 
Court is not formally obliged to adhere to 
previous precedents, but in the interests of legal 
certainty, predictability and equality before the 
law, it tries not to deviate from the previous 
precedent in the absence of proper grounds for 
doing so. But since the Convention is first and 
foremost a system of human rights protection, the 
Court must monitor the changes in conditions in 
the respondent State and in the Contracting States 
and respond, in particular, to any agreement on 
the achieved standards" (Millutin, 2014). 
 
In the human rights case, from time to time, the 
European Court of Human Rights has been 
known to openly abandon its previous case-law 
positions established in its decisions and to 
formulate new, contrary in content, legal 
positions. For example, in the case of Rees v. The 
United Kingdom (1986), the Court unanimously 
held that the concept of marriage covers only the 
traditional marriage between a man and a 
woman. The man who changed the sex could not 
obtain the right to marry another man. This 
decision was successfully overturned sixteen 
years later, when this issue changed not only 
within the Council of Europe but also beyond 
(European Court of Human Rights, 1985). 
 
The interpretation of the legal provisions of the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms by the European 
Court of Human Rights is characterized by 
indeterminate dynamics, the presence of 
sociocultural determinant spontaneity of the 
emergence of new social situations, the existence 
of possible different trajectories of movement of 
their solution, as a result of a "gap" between the 
abstract content of the provisions of the 
Convention and their understanding by the Court.  
 
Any normative legal act is characterized by 
generality; it cannot be fair on a case-by-case 
basis. The process of interpreting a norm of law 
is creative, co-authorial, and, in effect, a judge 
acts as a co-legislator, creates a new rule by 
performing the act of bringing a particular case 
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to a general norm of law. This process can be 
seen as an "ability of thought", a practical 
syllogism that implies the presence of a creative 
component in solving practical issues. According 
to this methodological approach, the 
interpretation is carried out by alternately 
moving from the argumentation used in the 
situation to the argumentation concerning the 
provisions of the law. Such a transition from the 
argumentation of the provisions of the law to the 
argumentation of a situation requiring a legal 
solution is always an attempt to interpret this 
norm, an attempt to understand it, and so adjust 
its content to the circumstances in order to ensure 
a fair resolution of the case. 
 
The central point in such a process is the 
Gadamer (1988) concept, according to which, 
because of a certain “elasticity” of legal 
regulation, actual law-making force of a case is 
constantly preparing a new codification, and the 
generality of the normative act and the specificity 
of the fact leave the field of action for the 
interpreter whose main problem is to minimize 
the gap between the law and a case. 
 
Attribution of legal consciousness in the 
judge's interpretive activity. 
 
In the process of interpretation there is personal 
knowledge, which cannot be definitely expressed 
by formal means; there are ideological guidelines 
that are perceived as axioms by judges. If 
purposefully developed objective methods of 
interpreting facts in the process of judicial 
knowledge could definitely ensure their 
comprehension, then the problem of 
interpretation was reduced to an exclusively 
technical mastery of operating legally 
meaningful and special legal terminology. 
However, interpretation is not a purely technical 
process; it involves all the spiritual potentials of 
the individual. 
 
The legal consciousness of subjects is important 
in the interpretation of the legislative texts 
(Bigun, 2009). The quality of the implementation 
of the requirements of legal provisions, their 
practical approval in accordance with the 
existing ideals and values of law depends on the 
level of legal consciousness and professionalism 
of legal practitioners. Worldviews in the form of 
a judge's personal beliefs, ideas and intentions, 
mediated by value orientations, are the 
axiological bases determining the internal, 
subjective aspect of the interpretation process 
(Rotan & Samsin & Yarema, 2013). 
 
At present, a judge cannot remain a faceless 
enforcer of the letter of the law; he/she must 
apply the current legislation creatively, relying 
on fairness, life and professional experience in 
his or her work (Denisenko & Siroid & Fadova 
& Shapovalova, 2015). By substituting the 
"spirit" of the law with the "letter" of the law in 
the judicial enforcement process, the judge 
actually reduces law and the act of legislation to 
a set of technical methods for conducting a 
certain number of court cases, thus disorienting 
the public about the essence of justice. 
Overcoming this negative and significant 
(according to social impact) tendency implies a 
clear and unambiguous understanding of 
personal responsibility by the judges, compliance 
with the rules of professional ethics, honest and 
conscientious performance of their duties, a 
manifestation of the necessary care for the 
preservation of both personal honor and dignity, 
as well as dignity and authority of the judiciary 
as a whole. 
 
Interpretation in judicial proceedings: the 
unity of communication and play principles. 
 
Interpretation in the judicial activity aims to 
solve problems of communication, clarification 
and explanation of different and sometimes 
contrary points of view on one or another 
investigated issue, finding common ground for 
exchange of ideas, discourse, and understanding 
of the essence of the case. 
 
Judicial proceedings are always a contest of 
conflicting or even contradictory interpretations 
of the same group of legally significant facts. To 
resolve a conflict by legal remedies for a court is 
to bring something into the situation that did not 
exist before – authoritative and with social 
consequences interpretation. The elaboration of 
this interpretation often appears as "a dispute in 
words", which at the same time manifests itself 
as "a dispute on its merits". The same 
phenomenon of legal reality can be interpreted 
differently (Van Hook, 2012). One of the most 
reliable criteria for the "permeability" of one or 
another version of interpretation is its textual 
form – a set of qualities that give it a special 
feature of semantic imperative. 
 
The expressive play semantics can be observed 
in the judicial proceedings, in which the 
capability of the hermeneutic constant is always 
increasing when it comes to legal discourse, legal 
communication concerning rights and 
obligations, beliefs in rightness and innocence. 
The judicial proceedings clearly express the 
intersection of thoughts of the parties, in which 
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the prosecution looks at a height of "the letter of 
the law" in the case, the generality of the norms 
of law, and the defense tries to show its 
originality, nonidentity with other cases, the 
inadmissibility of the proposed charges to the 
abstract provisions of the law of factual 
circumstances of the case. By engaging in such 
discourse generated by the parties to the case, the 
judge seeks to make a fair decision. 
 
Under such circumstances, the judge's 
interpretive activity is reduced to finding the true 
meaning of law and the act of legislation during 
legal discourse. Due to the actualization of 
certain interpretative meanings in the mind of the 
judge, understanding is formed in the process of 
this communication. The judge is at the 
intersection of a variety of discursive 
continuums, so it constantly unfolds "conflict of 
interpretations", which develops into "conflict of 
motivation". The semantic field will win if it has 
the greatest potential of argumentation from the 
standpoint of the relationship between the 
generality of the norm and the individual factual 
circumstances of the judicial case. 
 
Transformation of the conflict of 
interpretation of the norm-fact relations into 
the conflict of argumentation of the legal 
positions of the parties to a court action. 
 
Conditionally, a conflict of interpretations can be 
called a conflict between norm and fact. Norms 
are abstract and universal. The actual state of 
affairs, which requires the use of these norms, is 
particularly individual (Bocharov, 2011). Norms 
have many features, and the factual 
circumstances of the case are potentially 
innumerable. On the one hand, the circumstances 
of the case are described in norms by these 
features; on the other hand, the signs of the real 
state of affairs may serve not to use a norm which 
is apparent at first sight, but another, in order to 
clarify or reject certain features of factual 
circumstances of the case or, conversely, to add 
new ones (Alexi, 2009). 
 
In a particular legal position, this aspect of 
conflict is manifested in the parties' desire to 
convince the judge of the validity of their 
arguments, in particular, of the legal significance 
of any circumstances. Interpretation of a legally 
significant fact can be expressed in an intellectual 
version of a litigant interested in seeking to give 
legal significance at one time or another to the 
progress of cases. This view may not meet the 
requirements of maximum objectivity and 
disinterest in the operation of focusing on a legal 
fact (Zakomlistov, 2003). These points are 
conditioned through a system of communication 
codes that mediate the process of presenting and 
interpreting reasons and arguments in order to 
change the position or beliefs of the other party 
regarding the statement (Dudash, 2016). 
 
A factor of audience with its willingness to 
perceive the information as an argument for a 
particular position is a key component in 
understanding of the nature of judicial argument. 
Any evidence in the court may be defamed with 
doubt as to its plausibility and disproven by the 
means of rhetorical persuasion. In order to make 
a given audience in a given place and time to 
believe the speaker, one must know it. Therefore, 
it is worth mentioning the role of one of the most 
common logic and rhetorical methods of 
argumentation – the accent method, which allows 
improving the flexibility of interpretation, 
quickly switching from one point of view to 
another, sensitively responding to the changed 
situation. 
 
Cognitive accentuation is related to 
concentration, organization of material 
interpretation, orientation to situation and 
listener. In the context of comparative analysis, 
the application of this method differs in jury and 
professional court. Judgments on authenticity are 
made by the jury under the general impression or 
as a result of the use of eristic, psychological 
methods. Important points in judicial 
argumentation are the composition of the 
question with its simultaneous interpretation, the 
manner of conducting the interrogation, the 
language of the body, which form the image of 
the argumentat or as a sincere and decent person 
seeking to establish the truth, or, conversely, as a 
person who should not be trusted. In addition, the 
influence of psycholinguistic, emotional factors 
can also be reciprocated in the following: nothing 
affects the mind of the jury as a result of their 
own investigation; the discoveries made by them 
will always impress them most and often even 
ignore the contradictory fact in the case. 
Argumentation of the party's position in such 
courts is carried out through appeal to established 
statements and stable stereotypes (folklore – 
proverbs, parables, and sayings); great attention 
is paid to the question of interpretation of the fact 
as a phenomenon of objective reality, events, 
actions that took place in the past (Alexandrov, 
2009). In particular, the prosecution and defense 
in their speeches seek to convince the judge of 
the defendant's guilt or innocence, and as a result, 
in most cases the accent is on person-centered 
arguments rather than arguments pertaining to 
the dispute on its merits. In courts that include 
only professional judges, this accentuation can be 
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observed in part because the main issue that is 
being addressed is not the interpretation of a fact 
but the interpretation of the norm of the law 
(Andriyanova, 2013). The essence of judicial 
evidence de jure is defined as the discursive 
struggle of interpretations within the meaning of 
the text of the law, which forms the universe of 
communication in the judicial proceedings and is 
embodied in the "episteme" of the distinction 
between veritable and mistaken. 
 
The individual characteristics of the judge play a 
decisive role in the process of the judge's 
interpretive activity. Only a high moral person 
with the highest level of intentions of legal 
consciousness and adequate thinking is capable 
of adopting judicial verdicts from the standpoint 
of extended interpretation. Therefore, judicial 
reform should begin not with discussions 
concerning the ideal structure of the judicial 
system, but with a real improvement in the 
quality of the moral and professional capacity of 
judicial personnel. The judicial elite should think 
systematically and deeply, combining the "spirit" 
of law and the "letter" of the law, and have a 
differential sense of the importance of 
incumbency and maximum responsibility for 
their wrongful exercise. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The variety and complexity of legal positions 
require an appropriate evaluation – determining 
the scope of the "general" in each case. However, 
in order to "see" the general in the individual, the 
ability to determine algorithmic principles is not 
enough. Therefore, an adequate understanding of 
the legal position by a judge inevitably involves 
combining the individuality, unrepeatedness and 
uniqueness of the factual circumstances of the 
case with the generality and universality of the 
norm of the law. 
 
Judge's interpretive activity is a process that 
combines rational-technical and existential-
semantic levels, necessitates a high level of 
personal maturity and demands certain 
requirements for the development of 
professionally significant qualities in a judge. An 
important area of the problem is actualized with 
such an emphasis on the issues of the essential 
foundations of the professional legal 
interpretation. The interpretative origin of a 
judge should be sought not only in the field of 
objective formalization – in the law, but also in 
the judge himself / herself, his / her desire to 
achieve justice, an active position on the 
inviolability of constitutional rights and 
freedoms and guaranteeing the protection of 
universal values. 
 
Judge's interpretive activity is a process in which, 
in addition to logical and normative mechanisms 
determined by the peculiarities of the law-
enforcement activity, there are also valuable and 
irrational mechanisms caused by the 
gnoseological and ideological features of the 
judge's thinking. The analysis of the legal 
position of a judge cannot be considered only 
objective, it reflects both the mental capacity of 
the judge and his/her social values, 
understanding of the purpose and meaning of 
his/her activity. Intentional structures of 
consciousness play an important role in such a 
process; and no efforts of the state to regulate the 
formation of an internal conviction of a judge by 
means of the legislature will achieve their goal, 
just as any similar attempt to subordinate "the 
internal" to "the external". 
 
The dichotomous concept of fact-norm is 
expressed both from the point of view of 
asymmetric interpenetration and opposition. 
Norms are always abstract and universal, but the 
actual state of affairs, which requires the use of 
these norms, is specific and individual. The 
conflict of interpretation of the dichotomy of the 
fact-norm becomes a conditional conflict of 
argumentation, which is expressed as an 
interpretive projection of the construction of 
arguments by the parties to a court action in order 
to convince the opponents of the truth of the 
statement. 
 
In the judicial proceedings, with their expressive 
interpretive "play of meanings", the hermeneutic 
mechanism allows finding a common ground for 
exchanging and explaining the same set of 
legally significant facts and thus transforming 
"conflict of interpretations" into "conflict of 
argumentations" of legal positions of parties to a 
court action. Through this methodological 
tendency, there is a shift in emphasis from the 
analysis of the static meanings of law to their 
practical analysis. The interpretative component 
in the judicial activity is individual interpretation 
of reality in all the unity of its changeable 
processes, events, relations with the purpose of 
the next evolutional development of law or the 
formation of a new image of it. 
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